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11 January 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee

VIA: Chief, PCS/ [redacted]

FROM: Chief, PCS/ [redacted]

SUBJECT: Request for Modification of DCID on Security Controls
on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information

1. As a followup to our discussion on January 8, 1985 and to provide an official formal record of request, we hereby ask that the following proposed change in the DCID be submitted for Committee consideration in the near future. Please modify the first and second sentences in footnote 6 on page 6 of the DCID to read as follows: Non-Intelligence Community components of the executive branch of government under contract to fulfill an intelligence support role may be treated as members of the Intelligence Community. In that event, release will be made only with the consent of the originator, will be solely for the specific purpose and will not include authority to disseminate intelligence further.

2. As you know, this request is prompted by recent correspondence between CIA/DO and DIA, which we have shared with you, concerning DIA unilateral release of DO intelligence information reports to the Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. We believe our recommended change will help clarify an apparent ambiguity in the current language of the DCID.

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- c. The control markings in paragraph 8 shall be individually assigned at the time of preparation of intelligence products and used in conjunction with security classifications and other markings specified by Executive Order 12356 and its implementing ISOO Directive. The markings shall be carried forward to any new format in which the same information is incorporated, including oral and visual presentations.

10. Obsolete Restrictions and Markings

The following markings are obsolete and will not be used subsequent to the date of this directive: WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE-INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED, CONTROLLED DISSEM, NSC PARTICIPATING AGENCIES ONLY, INTEL COMPONENTS ONLY, LIMITED, CONTINUED CONTROL, NO DISSEM ABROAD, BACKGROUND USE ONLY, NO FOREIGN DISSEM, USIB ONLY, and NFIB ONLY. Questions with respect to the current application of control markings authorized by earlier directives on the dissemination and control of intelligence and used on documents issued prior to the date of this directive should be referred to the originating agency or department.

11. Reporting Unauthorized Disclosures

Violations of the foregoing restrictions and control markings that result in unauthorized disclosure by one agency of the intelligence of another shall be reported to the Director of Central Intelligence through the DCI Security Committee.

Part II

12. Policy and Procedures Governing the Release of Intelligence to Contractors and Consultants

- a. Intelligence Community components may release 'selected intelligence' to contractors and consultants (hereinafter "contractors"*) without referral to the originating components provided that:

- (1) Release is made only to private individuals or organizations certified by the SOIC (or his/her designee) of the sponsoring organization as being under contract to the United States Government for the purpose of performing classified services in support of a national security mission; and as having a demonstrated "need-to-know" and an appropriate security clearance or access approval. If retention of intelligence by the contractor is required, the contractor must have an approved storage facility.

* Release is the authorized visual, and, or physical disclosure of intelligence.

* The term "selected intelligence" excludes Foreign Service reports and SCI. Foreign Service reports may be released only with the permission of the Department of State. Release of SCI is governed by agreements and advisements between Intelligence Community components.

* Non-Intelligence Community government components under contract to fulfill an intelligence support role may be treated as members of the Intelligence Community. In that event, release will be solely for the specific purpose and will not include authority to disseminate intelligence further. Government-owned, contractor-operated (GOCO) laboratories performing classified services in support of the intelligence mission of an Intelligence Community component, and which are designated as authorized channels by an SOIC or his/her designee, are not considered as contractors subject to the provisions of this directive.